Mathematical Social Choice

Written By Lillian Craton

Sarah Barr

In this project, Mathematical Social Choice, or consensus theory, is addressed along with the many issues that can arise within approval voting and other voting models. The terminology used in Economics is readdressed mathematically. We will discuss the problem of axiomatically characterizing aggregation functions based on fair conditions. Arrow (1950) tells us there is no perfectly fair voting rule. However, by specifying a set of fairness conditions or axioms within a voting model, we discover that this can restrict voting rules to where there may only be one such rule. We also find other times that no such rule exists.

  • Sarah Barr is a senior mathematics major with a secondary certification. She has worked as a tutor, PASS leader, and student worker at the Academic Success Center and is currently a Lander University Teaching Fellow. Sarah is graduating Spring 2021 and is preparing to work as a high school math teacher in South Carolina.

Lillian Craton
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